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STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED

Whether

the

District

Court

improperly

held

that

p l a i n t i f f s ' medical malpractice action was not commenced within
the s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s

set forth

in §§78-14-4 and 78-14-8,

Utah Code Ann., (1953, as amended).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case is a medical malpractice action in which
Plaintiffs have alleged that their infant daughter's neurological
problems were caused by Defendants' negligence in the delivery of
their child.

Plaintiffs appeal from a final judgment entered in

the lower court

dismissing this action on the grounds that this

action was barred by the statute of limitations set forth in

§§78-14-4 and 78-14-8, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
This action was clearly filed within the time periods
and in accordance with the requirements of the Utah Health Care
Malpractice Act, U.C.A., 1953, 78-14-1 et seq., and therefore,
the lower court erred in dismissing this action.
The lower court's interpretation and application of the
relevant provisions of the Act is erroneous since it directly
contravenes

well

established

principles

of

statutory

construction and the plain language of the statutory provisions.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The relevant facts, which are not disputed by any of the
parties, are as follows:
1.

This is a "malpractice action against a health care

provider" as that phrase is defined
at Record on Appeal at p. 2.
Points and Authorities,
2.
occurrence",

in §78-14-3(29).

See also, Defendants' Memorandum of

Record on Appeal at p. 23.]

The dates of the alleged "act, omission, neglect or
for the purposes of §78-14-4 was between February

28, 1981 and March 1, 1981,

inclusive.

[See,

"Notice of Intent

to Commence Action (attached as Addendum B hereto),
Appeal at p. 30.
Authorities,

[Complaint

Record on

See also, Defendants' Memorandum of Points and

Record on Appeal at p. 23.]

2

3.

The date of discovery

of the "injury",

for the

purposes of §78-14-4 was between November 21, 1982 and December
1, 1982, inclusive.
hereto)/

[Affidavit of Chris S. Forbes (Addendum D

Record on Appeal at p. 77.

to Commence Action

See also, Notice of Intent

(Addendum B hereto),

Record on Appeal at p.

30.]
4.

The Notice of Intent to File a Malpractice Action,

required by §78-14-8, was served by certified mail on November
20, 1984.

[Affidavit of James G. Clark, Esq. (Adendum E hereto),

Record on Appeal at p. 74, and Notice of Intent to Commence
Action (Addendum B hereto), Record on Appeal at p. 30.]
5.
1985.

This malpractice action was commenced on March 12,

[Clerk's stamp on original,

hereto),

Record

on Appeal

filed Complaint

(Addendum F

at p. 2; £ £ £ fLJLiLS' Rule 3(a),

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.]
ARGUMENT
THE LOWER COURT INCORRECTLY
RULED THAT
THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION WAS
BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS SET
FORTH
IN § § 7 8 - 1 4 - 4 AND
78-14-8,
UTAH CODE ANN. (1953, as amended.)
Subject to the extensions granted under §78-14-8, §7814-4 establishes the time period in which a malpractice action
must

be commenced.

The relevant section of

§78-14-4 provides

as follows:
1. No malpractice action against a health
care provider may be brought unless it is
commenced within two years after the plaintiff
or patient discovers, or through the use of
3

reasonable diligence should have discoverd the
injury, whichever first occurs, but not to
exceed four years after the date of the
alleged act, omission, neglect or occurrence...
[The complete text of §78-14-4 is annexed hereto
as Addendum A.]
The

"applicable"

limitation

period

is the

first to

expire of the two alternative periods under §78-14-4; either two
years from discovery, or four years from the date of the alleged
malpractice.
In Foil vs. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144 (1979) this court
held that discovery occurs when the injured person knows or
should have known that he has suffered legal injury.

In this

action the plaintiffs discovered that the injury sustained by
their daughter may have been caused by negligence on or about
November

27, 1982 upon consulting medical personel at Primary

Childrens

Hospital.

[Affidavit

of Chris

hereto, Record on Appeal at p. 77.]

Forbes, Appendix D

The plaintiffs, in their

Notice of Intent to Commence a Civil Action, stated as follows:
On November 27, 1982, Nicole Lynn Forbes suffered
another such seizure, which resulted in more severe
paralysis. Upon entereing Primary Children's hospital for treatment on November 27, 1982, Chris Forbes
was informed that the the seizures and subsequent
brain damage were probably related to fetal distress,
hypoxia, and malpractice by the hospital and possibly
the doctors. [Notice of Intent, Appendix B hereto,
Record On Appeal at p. 30.]
By advising the defendants of the date of discovery the
plaintiffs acknowledged that the "two year" limitation period
began to run on November 27, 1982.
As demonstrated below, the applicable limitation period
4

in the instant case is two years from the date of discovery since
it would expire prior to the general "four year" limitation.
The date of alleged malpractice was between February 28,
1981 and March 1, 1981, inclusive.
discovery

of the

December

1,

injury

1982.

As noted above, the date of

was between November

Under

the

"two years

21,

from

1982 and

discovery"

provision, the plaintiffs' action would be barred after November
21,

1984.

Under

the

"four year" provision,

the plaintiffs 1

action would be barred after February 28, 1985.

Clearly the

shorter of the two periods is the "two year from
period and therfore it is the applicable period.

discovery"

The "four year"

limitation period is inapplicable and irrelevant to the case at
bar since it would not have expired until some months after the
expiration of the "two year from discovery" period of limitation.
Since all the parties agree that this action was not
commenced before the last week of November, 1984, which was the
applicable
whether

limitation

period,

the sole

issue

the provisions of §78-14-8 extended

presented

is

that period

of

limitation to a point sometime after the date the action was
actually commenced, to-wit:

March 12, 1985.

Section 78-14-8 reads, in relevant part, as follows:
Such notice shall be served within the time
allowed for commencing a malj ractice action
against a health care provider. If the notice
is served less than ninety days prior to the
expiration of the applicable time period, the
time for commencing the malpractice action
against the health care provider shall
be
5

extended to 120 days from the date of service
of notice. (Emphasis added.) [The complete
text of §78-14-8 is set forth in Addendum A
annexed hereto.]
It is undisputed that the Notice of Intent to Commence
an Action was served on all of the parties on November 20, 1984.
As previously noted, the "applicable" limitation was going to
expire on or about November 21, 1984, two years from the date of
discovery of the injury. The Notice of -Intent was
served a minimum

therefore

of one day prior to the expiration of the

"applicable time period".

Section 78-14-8 clearly provides that

when the notice of intent is filed "less than 90 days prior to
the expiration of the applicable time period...", as was done in
the case at bar,

"the

time

for

commencing

the

malpractice

action...shall be extended 120 days from the date of service of
the notice."

One hundred

and twenty days from the "date of

service of the notice" would place the applicable cut-off date at
March 20, 1985.

This action was commenced on March 12, 1985.

The lower court, in it's Memorandum Opinion,

initially

agrees with plaintiffs1 analysis, and finds that the "two year
from discovery" limitation period would be the first to expire,
and the Notice of Intent was filed

less than 90 days prior to

the expiration of the Stataute of Limitations.
Opinion at p. 2, Recoid on Appeal at p. 92.

[Memorandum

The entire text of

the lower court's Memorandum Opinion and Judgment is annexed
hereto

as Addendum

C.)

However,
6

the

lower

court

rejected

plaintiffs' argument that the filing of the Notice of Intent less
than

90

days

commencing

before

that

deadline

the malpractice

action

extended

"the

time

for

... to 120 days

from

the

service of the notice" or until March 20, 1985.

The lower court

proceeded instead to condition the unqualified extension provided
for in §78-14-8 by concluding that any such extension must fall
within the general "four year" limitation period of §78-14-4.
(Memorandum Opinion at p. 2, Addendum C hereto.)

In other words,

the lower court qualified the language of §78-14-8 by ruling that
the 120 day extension in which to commence the action would be
cut-off or defeated if the 120 days would place the cut-off date
beyond

the

general

"four

year"

limitation

of

§78-14-4.

[Memorandum Opinion at p. 2; Addendum C hereto at p. 2.)
Needless to say the plain language of §78-14-8 contains
no such condition, nor any other limitation.

It simply states

that if the notice is served within 90 days of the expiration of
the

statute

of

limitations

the...action. ..shall

be

service of the notice."

that

extended

"the
120

time

days

for

from

commencing
the

date

of

Plaintiffs respectfully submit that

extension is unqualified and unconditional.

If §78-14-8 was

subject to the conditions and qualifications imposed by the lower
court plaintiffs submit the statute would have so indicated.
It is important to recognize, before proceeding,
under

either

interpretation,

the maximum

amount

that

of time a

plaintiff could wait to file a malpractice action would be four
7

years plus the 120 days provided under §78-14-8.
In order for the lower court to conclude, as it did,
that this action was barred, it not only had to ignore the plain
language of §78-14-8,

it had

to conclude

that

there

was

a

conflict between the "four year" limitation period contained in
§78-14-4 and the unqualified extension granted by §78-14-8, and
determine that §78-14-4 controlled.
The lower court's interpretation violates many basic
tenets of statutory construction.
First,

the lower court unnecessarily concludes

there is a conflict between the two statutory provisions.
plaintiffs' proposed

interpretation

no

conflict

arises

that
Under

because

the "applicable" limitation period is simply determined by that
period which would first expire.
becomes meaningless.
essentially

Any other limitation period

The lower court's interpretation, however,

reimposes

the "four year" limitation period

if the

Notice of Intent is served more than two years prior to the
expiration of the "four year" limitation period.
reimposing

of the

"four year" limitation

which

It is this
creates

the

conflict with the apparently unqualified 120 day extension from
the date of service of the notice required by §78-14-8.

Such a

tortured, complicated and confusing interpretation is simply
unnecessary given the plain language of the statutory provisions.
Second, in resolving the statutory conflict, the lower
court concluded that the more general statutory provisions of
8

§78-14-4

controlled both the more recent and more

specific

statutory provisions of §78-14-8.
This Court has consistently held that where there is a
conflict between two statutory provisions, that provision which
is more specific in its application governs over that which is
more general.

Millet -v- Clark Clinic Corporation, 609 P2d 935,

(1980) at 936.

This tenet has full application to cases arising

under the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act.
Assuming,
plaintiffs

arguendo,

that

such

Id. at 936.
a

conflict

submit that §78-14-8 is specifically

exists,

applicable

to

this case and takes precedence over the more general provisions
of

§78-14-4.

Furthermore,

the

substance

of

§78-14-8

was

specifically amended in 1979 to to avoid any conflicts with §7814-8.

If a conflict still exists, plaintiff respectfully submits

that the provisions of §78-14-8 control.
Finally,

the

lower

court's

interpretation

and

application of §§78-14-4 and 78-14-8 renders portions of the
statutes meaningless and nonsensical.
The
by

the

lower

nonsensical

court

is

best

interpretation
illustrated

given
by

the

to

§78-14-8
following

hypothetical.
January 1, 1983

Date of malpractice

December 31, 1984

Date of discovery of injury

October 4, 1986

Notice of Intent Served

January 1, 1987

Both four year and two year
9

limitation period would
expire absent extension
January 2, 1987

First day could file (90 days
notice period expires January
1, 1987

Under the above hypothetical, if the lower court's
interpretation were applied, the hypothetical plaintiff would be
precluded from filing even though the Notice of Intent was filed
less than ninety days prior to the expiration of the two year
period but exactly ninety days prior to the expiration of the
four year period.

The earliest the plaintiff could file any

action requires him to wait for the ninety day notice period to
expire.

Under the hypothetical the 90 days would expire at 12:00

midnight January 1, 1989, simultaneously with the expiration of
the four year period.

Since, under the lower court's interpreta-

tion, §78-14-4 does not extend "the time for commencing
malpractice action", but merely extends the two year
action would be totally barred.
tation,

the

period, the

However, under such an interpre-

if the plaintiff had delayed even one day to serve his

Notice of Intent, he would have until January 31, 1989 in which
to file.

Given this hypothetical, the lower court's interpreta-

tion would totally prohibit the plaintiff who serves his notice
exactly 90 days before the four year statute would run and 89
days before the two year limitation would run from filing, but
would grant to a plaintiff who serves his notice a day later 120
days from the date of service.
Such a nonsensical result is to be avoided if it can be
10

done

so

consistent

Pride Club v. M i l l e r ,

with
572

the
P.2d

statutory

language.

(1977);

Grant v. Utah

385

State Land Board, 26 Utah 2d 100, 485 P.2d 1035 (1971).
If the same hypothetical were treated
plain meaning of the statute,
malpractice
date

of the

action...[would]...be
service

under the

"the time for commencing
extended

to 120 days

from

the
the

of the notice...", or until the end of

January, 1989.
The defendants recognized this apparent
their argument in the lower court and argued

flaw in

that rather than

extending the entire time in which to file, §78-14-4 merely
provides a window. [Defendants1 Memorandum,
p. 27].

Record on Appeal at

Both the lower court and the defendants fail to address

the issue of what happens, under their interpretation, if there
is no such window, or why, if such a window was contemplated by
the legislature, the plain language of §78-14-8 which extends the
time in which to file does so without limitation.
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Utah Code Annotated, Sections 78-14-4 and 78-14-8 should
be interpreted and applied based on the plain meaning of the
statutory

languge.

The plain language of §78-14-8 states that

the "the time for commencing a malpractice action....shall be
extended

120 days

from

the

of the

notice"

(emphasis added) if two conditions precedents are met.

First,

the plaintiff must serve a

date

of

service

Notice of Intent on the health care
11

providers in the form prescribed.

Second, service of the Notice

of

than

Intent

expiration

is

accomplished

of

the

statute

less
of

90

days

limitations.

prior
Both

of

to

the

these

conditions were met in the case at bar and therefore the statute
of limitations ran in this case on March 20, 1985, some 8 days
after the Complaint in this matter was filed.
The lower court improperly limited the 120 day entension
mandated by §78-14-8.

The limitations engrafted on §78-14-8 are

contrary to the plain language and meaning of the statute and
contravene many tenets of statutory construction.
Plaintiffs

respectfully pray that they be given their

day in court, and therefore request this Court to reverse the
lower court's judgment dismissing this action and remand this
matter to the District Court so that the claim of the plaintiffs
can be determined on the merits of their case.
DATED this 3rd day of September, 1985.

12

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that four copies of the foregoing
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS were served on each of the below
parties this

named

day of September, 1985, by depositing them in

the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to:
Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., Esq.
Francis J. Carney, Esq.
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON
175 South West Temple, 7th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480
Carman E. Kipp, Esq.
KIPP & CHRISTIAN, P.C.
32 Exchange Place, Suite #600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
R. Keith Nelson, Esq.
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
50 South Main, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144

BLM4/FORB/BRF

13

Addendum A

MALPRACTICE ACTIONS AGAINST HEALTH
CARE PROVIDERS
Section
78-14-4. Statute of limitations — Exceptions — Application.
78-14-8. Notice of intent to commence action.
78-14-1. Short title of act.
Law Reviews.
A New Perspective — Has Utah Entered
the Twentieth Century in Tort Law?, 1981
Utah L. Rev. 495.
78-14-4. Statute of limitations — Exceptions — Application. (1) No malpractice action against a health care provider may be brought unless it is commenced within two years after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the
use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury, whichever first
occurs, but not to exceed four years after the date of the alleged act, omission,
neglect or occurrencejexcept that:
(a) In an action where the allegation against the health care provider is that
a foreign object has been wrongfully left within a patient's body, the claim shall
be barred unless commenced within one year after the plaintiff or patient discovers,
or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the existence
of the foreign object wrongfully left in the patient's body, whichever first occurs;
and
(b) In an action where it is alleged that a patient has been prevented from discovering misconduct on the part of a health care provider because that health care
provider has affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal the alleged misconduct, the
claim shall be barred unless commenced within one year after the plaintiff or
patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence, should have discovered the fraudulent concealment, whichever first occurs.
(2) The provisions of this section shall apply to all persons, regardless of minority or other legal disability under section 78-12-36 or any other provision of the
law, and shall apply retroactively to all persons, partnerships, associations and corporations and to all health care providers and to all malpractice actions against
health care providers based upon alleged personal injuries which occurred prior
to the effective date of this act; provided, however, that any action which under
former law could have been commenced after the effective date of this act may
be commenced only within the unelapsed portion of time allowed under former law,
but any action which under former law could have been commenced more than four
years after the effective date of this act may be commenced only within four years
after the effective date o( this act.
History:
s^ 1

L. 1976, ch. 23, §4, 1979, ch 128,

78-14-8. Notice of intent to commence action. No malpractice action against
a health care provider may be initiated unless and until the plaintiff gives the prospective defendant or his executor or successor, at least ninety days' prior notice
of intent to commence an action. Such notice shall include a general statement of
the nature of the claim, the persons involved, the date, time and place of the occurrence, the circumstances thereof, specific allegations of misconduct on the part of
the prospective defendant, the nature of the alleged injuries and other damages
sustained. Notice may be in letter or affidavit form executed by the plaintiff or
his attorney. Service shall be accomplished by persons authorized and in the manner prescribed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for the service of the summons
and complaint in a civil action or by certified maiir*return receipt requested, in
which case notice shall be deemed to have been served on the date of mailing. fSuch
notice shall be served within the time allowed for commencing a malpractice action
against a health care provider. If the notice is served less than ninety days prior
to the expiration of the applicable time period, the time for commencing the malpractice action against the health care pro-ider shall be extended to 120 days from
the date of service of noticej
This section shall, for purposes of determining its retroactivity, not be construed
as relating to the limitation on the time for-commencing any action, and shall
apply only to causes of action arising on or after April 1, 1976. This section shall
not apply to third party actions, counterclaims or crossclaims against a health care
provider.
History:
§2.

L. 1976, ch. 23, §8; 1979, ch. 128,

Addendum A

JAMES CLARK
ATTORNEY AND COUNSELOR AT LAW
261 E. BROADWAY. SUITE 150
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH Will
Telephone 101 . 33MJOO

November 20, 1 984
To:

Donald Van Steeter, M.D.
1151 East 3900 South
Salt Lake City, Utah
84117
NOTICE OF INTENT TO COMMENCE CIVIL ACTION
AGAINST HEALTH CARE PROVIDER

Notice is hereby made, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated
(1953 as amended) §78-14-8, that a civil action is to be brought
against you on behalf of Chris Sorenson Forbes, Randy Coombs
Forbes, and Nicole Lynn Forbes (a minor).
GENERAL STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CLAIM
On or about February 27, 1981, Chris Sorenson Forbes called
Dr. Toshiko Toyota, who was Mrs. Forbes1 family doctor, and told
Dr. Toyota that she was bleeding vaginally. Mrs. Forbes was 9
months pregnant. Dr. Toyota, sent Mrs. Forbes to St. Marks
Hospital, where hospital staff monitored the fetus, declared no
distress was present and sent her home. It was negligent of the
hospital to send her home when she was bleeding. If Dr. Toyota
was informed of the circumstances and ratified the hospital's
action, then Dr. Toyota was negligent also.
On or about February 28, 1981, f,the baby stopped moving,M
Chris Sorenson Forbes felt. She went to St. Marks Hospital
where fetal monitoring documented severe fetal distress was
present. Dr. Donald Van Steeter, who had been previously
employed as an 0BGYN to deliver Mrs. Forbes in this case, Tras
called to do a cesarean section. From the time of entering the
hospital on February 28, until Nicole Lynn Forbes was delivered
on March 1, was over 6 hours.
The lapse in time between
discovery of the fetal distress and the delivery of Nicole
constituted negligence by the hospital. If Dr. Van Steeter was
notified that the fetus was in distress but failed to appear for
over 6 hours, he was negligent also.
Nicole Lynn Forbes suffered a grand mal seizure, at. 11^
months which resulted in paralysis of her right side. ^~On
November 27, 1982, Nicole Lynn Forbes suffered another such
seizure, which resulted in more severe paralysis. Upon entering
Primary Childrens Hospital for treatment on November 27, 1982,
Chris Forbes was informed that the seizures and subsequent brain
damage were probably related to fetal- distress, hypoxia, and
malpractice by the hospital and possibly the doctors.

Addendum B

PERSONS INVOLVED
Plaintiffs are Chris Sorenson Forbes and Randy Coombs
Forbes, individually and as guardians and natural parents of
Nicole Lynn Forbes.
Defendants are St. Marks Hospital, Dr. Donald Van Steeter,
M.D., Dr. Toshiko Toyota, M.D., and John Does 1 through 20
(personnel entrusted with care).
DATE, TIME & PLACE OF OCCURRENCE
The incidents complained of occurred on the 27th, and 28th
of February, and on the 1st of March, 1981.
The place of
occurrence was St. Marks Hospital, and wherever the other
defendants may have been when and if they were negligent, the
home of the plaintiffs, and the path of their travels to obtain
proper health care.
CIRCUMSTANCES OF MALPRACTICE
These are set forth fully, above.
SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS OF MISCONDUCT ON THE PART OF THE
PROSPECTIVE DEFENDANTS
The defendants allowed Chris Forbes to go home when she
should have remained under observation for her bleeding, and
failed to timely deliver Nicole Forbes by caserean section once
fetal distress was discovered.
NATURE OF ALLEGED INJURIES AND OTHER DAMAGES SUSTAINED
As a result of the negligence of the named defendants,
Nicole Lynn Forbes has suffered brain damage and paralysis,
resulting in her needing special speech therapy and physical
therapy and psychiatric counseling, along with other special and
general damages to her and her natural parents.
I would recommend that this matter be turned over to your
malpractice carrier in the hopes that this matter can be settled
in a reasonable and expedient manner, and in the absence of a
lawsuit being filed.
Very truly yours;

JAMES CLARK, Esq.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN; AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CHRIS SORENSON FORBES and
RANDY COOMBS FORBES, individually and as guardians and
natural parents of NICHOLE
LYNN FORBES,

:
:
:

Plaintiffs,
vs.

:

MEMORANDUM DECISION

:

CIVIL NO. C 85-1531

ST. MARKS 1 S HOSPITAL, a Utah
:
corporation, DONALD VAN
STREETER, M.D., TOSHIKO TOYOTA, :
M.D., and JOHN DOES 1 through
20,
'
:
Defendants.
Defendants
Complaint
This

by

statute

unless

it

seek

the

enough
the

and
fact

notice

can
run,

at
be
and

of

the

judgment
Statute

dismissing

plaintiffs1

of Limitations (78-14-4).

provides that "No malpractice action may be brought

is

commenced
the

date
would
that

not

(3)

two

... but

the

alleged
present

78-14-8

least
served

within

injury

of

requirement

until

summary

reason

... discovered
after

:

(1)

not
act

any

provides

means,

years
to

after the plaintiff
exceed

...".
problem

a

that

notice
no

suit

This

four

years

seems clear

if it were not for
requirement.

The

can be commenced

90 days after serving the notice, (2) the notice
any
if

it

time

before

the statute of limitations has

is

served

less

than

90 days before the
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FORBES, ET AL V.
ST. MARKS, ET AL.

statute
suit
of

of

for
the

limitation
a

period

year

statute

the

four

year

days

period"
to

that

of
four

the

year

3/12/85.
definite
of

two

120

year

days
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from

in

the time for filing

the time of the service

this

thus

finds
the

then

off

to

holds

date

if

the

was

to

four

case

of
notice

of
be

not extend

served

"less than

the
the
term

applicable time
four year term as
would

expire on

whether or not the extension

3/20/85
3/1/85.
that

would extend the

It would

not

year
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expiring

court

it

expiration

court

period

period

cut

extends

days

because

to
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This

it

notice

period

this
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of limitation to 3/20/85.

extension

3/1/85.

120

The

prior

which

expires

of

"notice".

two

ninety

PAGE TWO

takes precedence over the
This

78-14-4

action

was filed on

intended

to

fix

a

four

years

subject to an extension

is

filed

"within"

90 days prior

to that cut off date.
Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and the case dismissed,

Dated this

3

Cj

day of April, 1985
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CHRIS SORENSON FORBES and
RANDY COOMBS FORBES individually
and as guardians and natural
parents of NICOLE LYNN FORBES,

AFFIDAVIT OF
CHRIS S. FORBES

Plaintiffs,
vs.
ST. MARK'S HOSPITAL, a Utah
corporation; DON VAN STEETER,
M.D.; TOSHIKO TOYOTA, M.D.; and
JOHN DOES 1 through 20,

Civil No. C-85-1531
HON. JAMES S. SAWAYA

Defendants.

CHRIS S. FORBES, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes
and states as follows:
1.

That I am one of the plaintiffs in the above action.

2.

That I am the natural mother of Nicole Lynn Forbes

and the wife of plaintiff Randy C. Forbes.
3.

That I first

learned that the injury sustained by

Nicole could be attributable to childbirth and/or the negligenttreatment of myself and my daughter on or about November 27,
1982.

It

was

on

that

date

that

4

I was

consulting

medical

Addendum D

77

personnel

at
4.

I

informed

either

Primary Children's

Hospital.

Upon b e i n g a d v i s e d

by P r i m a r y

my h u s b a n d .

myself

daughters

To my k n o w l e d g e

o r my h u s b a n d

this

even c o n s i d e r e d

is
the

the

personnel,
first

cause

time

of

our

injury.
DATED t h i s ^\Ti^S^Y

of A p r i l ,

1985.
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of

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby

certify

that a copy

Affidavit of Chris S. Forbes was served this

of the
11$

foregoing

day of April,

1985, by depositing it in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to:
Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., Esq.
Francis J. Carney, Esq.
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON
175 South West Temple, 7th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480
Carman E. Kipp, Esq.
KIPP & CHRISTIAN, P.C.
32 Exchange Place, Suite #600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
R. Keith Nelson-, Esq.
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
50 South Main, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
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BRYAN L. McDOUGAL #932
Attorney for Plaintiffs
8 East Broadway
Suite 735, Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-1300
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CHRIS SORENSON FORBES and
RANDY COOMBS FORBES individually
and as guardians and natural
parents of NICOLE LYNN FORBES,

]

I

AFFIDAVIT OF
JAMES G. CLARK

]1

Civil No. C-85-1531

Plaintiffs,
vs.
ST. MARK'S HOSPITAL, a Utah
corporation; DON VAN STEETER,
M.D.; TOSHIKO TOYOTA, M.D.; and
JOHN DOES 1 through 20,

HON.

JAMES S. SAWAYA

Defendants.

JAMES G. CLARK, being first duly sworn upon his oath
deposes and states as follows:
1.

Consistent with the statutory requirements of

§78-14-8, I mailed the Notice of Intent to Commence Civil Action
Against Health Care Provider on November 20, 1984.
2.

The notices were sent out Certified Mail,

Return

Receipt Requested (certified nos. P-592-383-179/P-592-383-180 and
P-592-383-181).

Return receipts were received in the case of all

three Defendants and are in the file.

Addendum E
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3.

Mrs. Forbes had informed me that she discovered the

malpractice on or about November 27, 1982.
Further affiant sayeth naught.
DATED this

/7~f

day of April, 1985.

Jajftess G.

SUBSCRIB

Clark

RN t o b e f o r e me t h i s

/7

day

April, 1985.

My Commission Exp

Re

z&H4t&

-C

2

z

of

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby

certify

that a copy

Affidavit of James G. Clark was served this

of the

foregoing

day of April,

1985, by depositing it in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to:
Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., Esq.
Francis J. Carney, Esq.
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON
175 South West Temple, 7th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480
Carman E. Kipp, Esq.
KIPP & CHRISTIAN, P.C.
32 Exchange Place, Suite #600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
R. Keith Nelson, Esq.
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
50 South Main, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
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JAMES CLARK, Esq., BAR #3637
Attorneys for the Plaintiffs
261 East Broadway, Suite 150
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH

CHRIS SORENSON FORBES and RANDY
)
COOMBS FORBES individually and as
guardians and natural parents of
NICOLE LYNN FORBES,

C O M P L A I N T

Plaintiffs,
vs .
ST. MARKS HOSPITAL, a Utah
Corporation, DONALD VAN STEETER
M.D.,. TOSHIKO TOYOTA, M.D., and
JOHN DOES 1 through 20,

\
\
]
]1

(Judge:

Defendants.

)

Civil No.

The

Plaintiffs,

by

and

through

their

attorneys,

hereby

complain and allege against the defendants as follows:
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1.

That all Plaintiffs and all Defendants

reside

in

Salt

uake County, State of Utah.
2.

That at all times relevent to this action,

ants, and each of them, were doing business in Salt

the

Defend-

Lake

County,

State of Utah.
3.

That all the incidents complained of in

this

complaint

Addendum" F"

took place in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
*J. That at all times herein
through 20, inclusive and

each

mentioned,
of

them

Defendants

were

Does

doctors, nurses,

attendants, employees, assistants and consultants and the like
Defendants St. Marks Hospital, Dr. Toshiko

1

Toyota,

M.D.,

of

and/or

Dr. Donald Van Steeter.
That the true names
unknown

to

Plaintiffs,

or

capacities

of

who

therefore,

proceed

Defendants by such fictitious names and

will

each

of

them

against

ask

the

are
these

Court

to

amend the complaint when the same shall have been ascertained.
5.

That at all times

mentioned

herein,

defendant

Toshiko

Toyota, M.D., Donald Van Steeter, M.D., St. Marks Hospital, a Utah
Corporation, and John Does 1 through 20 were the agents, servants,
and employees, assistants and consultants of their

co-defendants,

and were, as such, acting within the course, scope

and

authority

of said agency and employment and that each and every defendant as
aforesaid, one

acting

as

a

principal,

selection, hiring, and/or supervision
defendant

as

an

agent,

servant,

of

was
each

employee,

negligent
and

every

assistant,

in

the

other
and/or

consultant.
FIRST CAUSE OP ACTION
Plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys, allege as follows
versus Dr. Toshiko Toyota, M.D.
9.

Sometime during the Spring of 1980, Chris Sorenson Forbes

consulted the defendant Toshiko Toyota with reference to obtaining
-2-

said defendant's care

and

treatment

delivery of her expected child.

during

Defendant

her

pregnancy

and

Toyota

undertook

the

care of Chris Forbes and she provided Dr. Toyota with her previous
medical history and

authorized

the

defendant,

Toshiko

Toyota,

M.D., to obtain any needed medical records.
10.

That Dr.

Toshiko

Toyota,

as

a

doctor

engaged

for

compensation, owed a duty to plaintiff Chris

Forbes

to

due

use

care in her treatment.
11.

On or about February 27,

1981,

Chris

Sorenson

Forbes

called Dr. Toshiko Toyota, who was Mrs. Forbes1 family doctor, and
told Dr. Toyota that she was bleeding vaginally.
9 months pregnant.
Marks Hospital.

Dr. Toyota told

The

hospital

Mrs.

staff

declared no distress was present.

Mrs. Forbes

Forbes

to

monitored

the

go

was

to

St.

fetus

and

Dr. Toyota was then notified of

the circumstances, and although Chris Forbes was

still

bleeding,

she was sent home.
11.

That Dr. Toyota was negligent in the treatment and care

of Chris Forbes in that the doctor failed to exercise
the degree of skill, standard of

care, and

exercised or possessed by

such

similar

localities

having

other

regard

to

learning

physicians
the

or

possess

ordinarily

practicing

existing * state

in
of

knowledge in medicine and surgery. Said-defendant was negligent in
the following particulars, among others:
(a)

Toshiko Toyotafs failure to

recognize,

t- st

for, or

diagnose that Chris Forbes was suffering from a detached placenta.
(b) Toshiko Toyota's failure to do a
-3-

"risk

evaluation"

or

"stress test" on plaintiff Chris Forbes prior to delivery,

or

at

the time she was sent to the hospital for vaginal bleeding.
(c) The Defendants1 failure to keep

Chris

Forbes

in

the

Hospital for evaluation and observation.
(d)

The Defendants1 failure to recognize

the

seriousness,

urgency and cause of the complications being experienced by

Chris

Forbes.
(e)
cesarean

Defendants1

The
section

failure

operation

to

to

remove

recommend
the

or

minor

order

child

a

when

complications became apparent.
(f)

The Defendants1 failure to timely seek

and advice from competent experts in

the

additional

field

of

aid

OB/GYN

when

complications became apparent.
(g)

The Defendants'

failure

to

potential problems, the danger signs, and

inform

Chris

Forbes

of

recommended

action

to

take should the problems continue or increase.
12.

That Dr. Toyota informed the

Hospital,

through

Nurse

Minie, that Chris Forbes should be given a sleeping pill and
home.

sent

The Hospital conveyed this information to Chris Forbes.
13.

That

approximately

9:00

shortly
p.m.

after
on

the

February

continued to experience problems and

above
28,

returned

The hospital, through its agents, did another

incidents,

1981
to

Chris
the

fetal

at

Forbes

hospital.

monitor

and

discovered "severe fetal distress."
14.

That the minor child, Nicole Lynn Forbes, was

cesarean section at about 3:30 a.m. on March 1, 1981.
-4-

born

by

15.

That as a direct and proximate cause of the

of Defendant Toshiko Toyota, Plaintiff Chris Forbes
and continues to suffer special and

general

negligence

has

damages

suffered

subject

to

proof 16.

That as a direct and proximate cause of the

of Defendant Toshiko Toyota, Plaintiff
incurred substantial

medical

suffered and continues

to

Randy

Coombs

bills, mental

suffer

special

negligence
Forbes

distress,
and

and

general

has
has

damages

subject to proof.
17.

That as a direct and proximate result of the negligence

of Defendant Toshiko Toyota, Plaintiff Nicole Lynn Forbes suffered
Hypoxia, Anoxia, which has resulted in seizures causing paralysis,
and brain damage.

Nicole

Lynn

therapy, physical therapy, and
suffered and continues

to

Forbes

requires

psychiatric

suffer

special

special

counseling,
and

speech
and

has

general

damages

allege

against

subject to proof.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
COME NOW the Plaintiffs, and

complain

and

Defendant St. Marks Hospital, a Utah Corporation, as follows:
18.

Plaintiffs hereby reallege and by this reference hereby

incorporate all allegations contained in paragraphs 1

through

17

of this Complaint.
19.

Plaintiff

is

informed

and

believes

and

information and belief alleges that defendant St. Marks

upon

Hospital,

a Utah Corporation, is authorized and licensed to conduct and
conduct a hospital and business or
-5-

businesses

in

the

such

State

did
of

Utah, County of Salt Lake, to which hospital or hospitals, members
of the public were invited including the plaintiff Chris

Sorenson

Forbes .
20.

On or about the 28th day of February,

Chris Forbes entered the St. Marks Hospital, a

1981,

Utah

Plaintiff

Corporation.

Plaintiff entered the hospital requesting care with regard to

the

vaginal bleeding she

her

pregnancy.

was

Plaintiff had

experiencing
received

in

connection

with

prenatal

care

for

approx-

imately seven to nine months prior to entering

said

hospital

by

defendant Toshiko Toyota, M.D.
21.

On or about the 28th day of February 1981, plaintiff

Chris Forbes consulted and engaged for compensation the services
of defendant Toshiko Toyota, M.D., St.
Van Steeter, M.D., and John Does

1

Marks

through

Hospital,
20

examine, diagnose, prescribe medicines and drugs,
for and treat her process of pregnancy and child
perform the necessary surgery or medical treatment

Donald

inclusive, to
and

to

birth
of

care

and

to

this

or

any other condition, if any of the same were required.
22.

That on or about the 26th day of

August,

1982, and

prior thereto, and thereafter, defendants Toshiko Toyota, M.D,,
Donald Van Steeter, M.D., St. Marks Hospital
through 20 and each of them,

undertook

to

and

John

examine, diagnose,

prescribe medicines and drugs, handle and control the
treatment of the Plaintiff, and

to

perform

does 1

care

and

said

delivery

of

and

diagnosis

of

plaintiff's child.
23-

That in the aforesaid examination
-6-

Plaintiff Chris Forbes, said defendants were

negligent

in

the

following particulars among others:
(a)

St. Marks Hospital,

trator over its staff
M.D., and Donald Van

and

as

a

supervisor

specifically

Steeter,

M.D.,

over

is

and

adminis-

Toshiko

Toyota,

responsible

for

the

negligent actions by said staff and doctors in the treatment and
delivery of Pauline Vetter and Joseph Paul Vetter respectively.
(b)

St. Marks Hospital, its

nurses

and

administration,

are independantly negligent in failing to review, supervise, or
consult during the treatment and methods of treatment
its staff, Toshiko Toyota, M.D., and Donald Van

given

by

Steeter, M.D.,

to Chris Forbes and Nicole Lynn Forbes.
(c)
istration

St. Marks Hospital, its
were

negligent

in

staff,

failing

hospital authorites of the impropriety

nurses,

and

admin-

advise

the

proper

to
and

inadequacy

treatment being given by Toshiko Toyota, M.D.,
Steeter, M.D., to Chris Forbes and Nicole

and

Lynn

of

the

Donald

Van

Forbes,

such a report was made, the hospital was negligent in
that said administration or

staff

supervisor

or

if

the

fact

to

take

failed

appropriate action.
i

(d)

St. Marks Hospital, its staff, nurses and

istration are independently negligent in

failing

to

adminestablish

adequate policies, statements and safeguards to prevent a

staff

member or other medical doctor to utilize nospital equipment and
treatment methods in poor judgment or

when

staff member is not competent to operate said
-7-

said

physician

equipment

to

or
an

adequate and safe degree of efficiency.
(e)

The Defendants allowed Chris Forbes to

go

home

when

she should have remained under observation for her bleeding, and
failed to timely deliver Nicole Forbes by caserean section

once

fetal distress was discovered.
(f)

The Defendants were negligent in

the appropriate tests, including but not
sound examination, which would

have

detached placenta and

for

allowed

failing

limited

showed

the

timely

to
to

conduct

an

ultra

problems

surgical

or

and
other

preventive intervention.
(g)

The Defendants were negligent in failing to notify

consult with an OB/GYN specialist when Chris

Forbes

came

or
into

the hospital bleeding vaginally.
(h)

The Defendants were negligent in failing to conduct

a

meaningful or competant fetal monitor.
(i)

The Defendants were negligent in failing to give Chris

Forbes adequate instructions for dealing

with

and

recognizing

problems associated with the vaginal bleeding, at the

time

she

find

and

was sent home from the hospital on February 27th.
(j)

The Defendants were negligent in failing to

i

identify the cause of the vaginal bleeding.
10. That as a direct and proximate result of the negligence
of defendant St. Marks

Hospital,

a

Utah

Corporation,

Toshiko

Toyota, M.D., Donald Van oceeter, M.D.,

and John does 1 through

20, inclusive as aforesaid, plaintiffs,

Chris

and Randy Coombs Forbes, individually and as
-8-

Sorenson
the

Forbes,

guardians

and

natural parents of Nicole Lynn Forbes have suffered and

continue

to suffer permanent physical, mental, and emotional, and monetary
injuries, in an amount subject to proof at trial.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
COME NOW the Plaintiffs, and complain and allege as follows
versus Donald Van Steeter, M.D.:
25.

Plaintiffs hereby reallege and by this reference hereby

incorporate all allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through

24

of this Complaint.
26.

That at approximately 9:00 p.m., on

the

28th

day

of

February, 1981, Plaintiff again entered the hospital, pursuant to
Dr. Toyotafs recommendation, due to vaginal bleeding,and the—rran
.roovomont of the bgrfry? A fetal

monitor

disclosed

severe

fetal

distress .
27.

Dr. Donald Van Steeter, a

specialist

called in for consultation, and the decision was

in

OB/GYN, was

made

to

do a

cesarean section since labor was not progressing naturally.
28.

Dr. Donald Van Steeter, as a specialist

the area of OB/GYN, owed a duty of due care

to

practicing
Plaintiff

in

Chris

Forbes, as his patient.
29.

Dr. Donald Van Steeter was negligent in his 'care

and

treatment of Plaintiff Chris Forbes in the following particulars,
among others:
(a)

He failed to

take

or

recommend

action

which

would

reduce the severity of the existing fetal distress.
(b)

Dr. Van Steeter was notified of the problem at

approx-

-9-

10

imately 10:00 p.m., but he failed

to

deliver

the

minor

child

until approximately 3:30 a.m., the following day.
30.

That as a direct and proximate cause of the

of Dr. Tan Steeter, the minor child
anoxia which resulted in post
Forbes.

suffered

partum

from

seizures

negligence
hypoxia

to

and

Nicole

Lynn

The post partum seizures caused paralysis, brain damage,

psycological damage, emotional

damage,

and

other

special

and

general damages as shall be proved at the time of trial.
31.

As a direct and proximate result of the

Dr. Van Steeter,
Coombs

Forbes

Plaintiffs

individually

Chris
and

Sorenson
as

guardians of Nicole Lynn Forbes have

the

Forbes

natural

suffered

negligence

and

and

of

Randy

parents

and

continue

to

suffer general, special, and monetary damages subject to proof at
trial.
WHEREFORE PLAINTIFFS PRAY for judgment against

the

Defend-

ants, and each of them, as follows:
1.

For general damages in an amount to be proved at

trial

pursuant to Plaintiffs1 first through third causes of action.
2.

For special damages in an amount to be proved at

trial

pursuant to Plaintiffs1 first through third causes of action.
3.

For Plaintiffs1

costs,

and

such

other

ancl further

relief as the Court deems proper in the premises.
DATED and signed this 7 ^

day of March, 1985.

Plaintiffs1 Address is
10838 Savanah Drive
Sandy, Utah
84070

fj3^<

L. McDOUGAL,/ Estfl
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